How convincing is Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika’s analysis of reality as an ontology of seven ‘categories of things that exist’ (padārthas)? [Feel free to address what you wish of this theory, e.g. their theory of substances and qualities/actions, their theory of universals and particularities, their theory of the relation of inherence (samavāya), viz. identity-in-difference, (and whether inherence is both coherent and sufficient to integrate their pluralistic ontology into a unified whole).]
Examine and assess Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika’s theory of the self (ātman) and of what constitutes liberation (mokṣa).
Examine and assess Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika’s doctrine that the effect does not exist in its cause (asatkāryavāda). You may wish to consider here their mereological arguments claiming that wholes are ontologically distinct from their parts.
Examine and assess Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika’s theory of the realism of universals (sāmānya) and/or their theory of the realism of nonexistences (abhāva).
Assess Nyāya’s theory of valid inference (anumāna), including whether their doctrine of the invariable concomitance/pervasion of properties solves the problem of induction.
Assess the debate between Nyāya’s doctrine of four valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa) and the Materialist (Carvāka) School’s doctrine that perception is the only valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa).
Does Nyāya theory of the valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa) give a satisfactory account of what knowledge is,of what establishes what knowledge is,and of how we know that we know?
Main sources:
Hiriyanna, M. (1932) Outlines of Indian Philosophy, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass.
Radhakrishnan, S. & Moore, C. A. (eds.) (1957) A Source Book in Indian Philosophy, Princeton, Princeton University Press, referred to below as SB
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